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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

STRETCHING ARMSTRONG: HOW THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
INCORRECTLY APPLIED SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IN
DOES V. GILLESPIE

ABSTRACT
Medicaid serves as an important source of health insurance for millions of
Americans. One of the Act’s core tenants is the patient’s freedom to choose from
any qualified and willing provider. This “freedom of choice” provision was
eventually codified, and subsequent protections were put in place to protect a
patient’s choice regarding family planning services. However, as states attempt
to limit access to family planning services by severing their Medicaid contracts
with Planned Parenthood, patients must rely on § 1983 to pursue relief in federal
courts. Section 1983 provides a right of action for the violation of any federal
right or law. Courts have routinely allowed Medicaid patients to use § 1983 to
access federal court. In fact, five circuit courts of appeals have all held the
freedom of choice provision creates a right that can be enforced in federal court.
Unfortunately, however, the Eighth Circuit in Does v. Gillespie held otherwise
by incorrectly applying Supreme Court precedent. This created a circuit split to
position Does to be the case that gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to
potentially close the door on all § 1983 private rights of action in Medicaid
cases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Medicaid was initially passed in 1965, and since then, it has been a staple of
the American health care system. 1 One of the core tenets of Medicaid is the
patient’s freedom to choose from any qualified provider offering medical
services. 2 In the first two years after its enactment, there was evidence that states
were limiting beneficiaries’ access to health care by funneling patients to certain
government facilities and restricting payments to providers. 3 This ran counter to
Medicaid’s goal of expanding access to health care. 4 Accordingly, in 1967,
Congress enacted a provision solidifying patients’ ability to choose from any
qualified and willing provider. 5 Codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A), the
provision has become known as the “free choice of provider” or “freedom of
choice” provision. 6
During the rise of Medicaid managed care plans, Congress authorized the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to waive the freedom of choice
provision and allow states to utilize risk-based managed care plans for Medicaid
beneficiaries. 7 This proved problematic in relation to family planning services,
because religious plans refused to include family planning services in their
agreements and many traditional family planning providers were excluded from
managed care networks. 8 In response, Congress amended the statute to explicitly
preserve patients’ freedom of choice for family planning services. 9
This additional protection of patient choice has been in place since 1986, 10
though states have recently attempted to limit access to family planning services
by removing funding from Planned Parenthood. 11 Several states have tried to cut

1. See Judith D. Moore & David G. Smith, Legislating Medicaid: Considering Medicaid and
Its Origins, 27 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 45, 45 (2005).
2. Laura Cartwright-Smith & Sarah Rosenbaum, Medicaid’s Free-Choice-of-Provider
Protections in a Family Planning Context: Planned Parenthood Federation of Indiana v.
Commissioner of the Indiana State Department of Health, 127 PUB. HEALTH REP. 119, 120 (2012).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Sara Rosenbaum et al., Medicaid Managed Care and the Family Planning Free-Choice
Exemption: Beyond the Freedom to Choose, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y AND L. 1191, 1193–94
(1997).
8. Id. at 1196.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(B) (2012); Rosenbaum et al., supra note 7, at 1196 (explaining
how the Secretary of HHS was no longer able to use utilize freedom of choice waivers for family
planning services in the managed care context).
10. Rosenbaum et al., supra note 7, at 1196.
11. Kinsey Hasstedt, Understanding Planned Parenthood’s Critical Role in the Nation’s
Family Planning Safety Net, 20 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 13, 13 (2017).
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off state funding by ending their Medicaid contracts with the organization, 12
which is the predominant source of family planning services for many women. 13
Accordingly, threats to funding for Planned Parenthood serve as direct threats to
patient choice for women all across the U.S.
Enforcement of the freedom of choice provision, however, has proved
difficult. The Secretary of HHS has limited enforcement authority to force states
into compliance with the provision, and the Medicaid Act lacks sufficient
administrative remedies to address violations of patient choice. That leaves
Medicaid patients to seek redress in federal court for state violations of the
freedom of choice provision. Fortunately, federal appellate courts have routinely
held the freedom of choice provision provides an individual right that can be
enforced in federal court under § 1983. 14
In a recent decision, however, the Eighth Circuit held patients cannot use
§ 1983 to enforce the provision. 15 Rather than follow the analysis of its sister
courts, the Eighth Circuit relied on language from a rather curious Supreme
Court case, 16 one analyzing claims arising under the Supremacy Clause and not
§ 1983. 17 The Eighth Circuit applied the incorrect rules of statutory
interpretation for analyzing § 1983 claims, particularly in relation to Medicaid.
In so doing, the court supplanted binding precedent with dicta. Accordingly, the
court in Does wrongly held the Supreme Court overturned its own precedent,
effectively re-writing well-established, long applied § 1983 analysis for
Medicaid cases and setting up a circuit split to position Does to be the case that
gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to potentially close the door on all
§1983 private rights of action in Medicaid cases.
II. MEDICAID AND THE IMPORTANCE OF § 1983 PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION
Medicaid is the nation’s public health insurance program for people with
low income, and it covers more than seventy million Americans. 18 Program
participants include children and their parents, pregnant woman, frail elderly

12. Jackie Calmes, States Move to Cut Funds for Planned Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/states-move-to-cut-funds-for-planned-parent
hood.html.
13. See Hasstedt, supra note 11.
14. Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc.
v. Ind. State Dep’t Health, 699 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v.
Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2013); Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862
F.3d 445, 457 (5th Cir. 2017); Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Andersen, 882 F.3d 1205, 1224 (10th
Cir. 2018). But see Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 2017).
15. Does, 867 F.3d at 1046.
16. Id.
17. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015).
18. KAISER FAM. FOUND., MEDICAID POCKET PRIMER 1 (2017), http://files.kff.org/attach
mentFact-Sheet-Medicaid-Pocket-Primer.
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individuals, and people with certain disabilities. 19 Since its inception, Medicaid
has evolved to reflect certain federal policy goals. 20 Once such goal was
allowing Medicaid patients to choose their care, rather than requiring they use
certain access points selected by state governments. 21 Accordingly, Medicaid’s
“free choice of provider” or “freedom of choice” provision was added to the Act
through an amendment in 1967. 22
Despite serving as an important protection for patients, forcing a state to
comply with the freedom of choice provision is difficult. HHS has some
enforcement power, but HHS remedies are limited and counterproductive.
Further, although the Medicaid Act includes administrative appeals processes
for patients, they are not adequate to address attacks on patients’ freedom of
choice. Accordingly, when a patient’s choice has been restricted by the state, her
only avenue is to seek redress in federal court. Thus, it is imperative for courts
to keep their doors open to Medicaid patients seeking to enforce the right to the
provider of their choice.
A.

Medicaid is a Cooperative Federal-State Program

Medicaid operates as a cooperative federal-state program; the federal
government provides matching funds to states that agree to abide by the
requirements of the Medicaid Act. 23 Essentially, the federal government
promises federal funding to states in exchange for the states’ promise to provide
medical assistance to mandatory categories of people. 24
The freedom of choice provision was added to Medicaid in 1967 in response
to states restricting beneficiaries’ access to health care providers and facilities of
the states’ choosing. 25 Largely unchanged since it was first added, the freedom
of choice provision states: “[A]ny individual eligible for medical assistance …
may obtain such assistance from any institution, agency, community pharmacy,
or person, qualified to perform the service or services required who undertakes
to provide him such services[.]” 26
As federal policy changed through the years and Medicaid evolved to cover
more people and services, the freedom of choice provision automatically applied

19. MACPAC, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MEDICAID AND CHIP 3 (2017), https://www.mac
pac.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/June-2017-Report-to-Congress-on-Medicaid-and-CHIP.pdf.
20. Id.
21. Cartwright-Smith & Rosenbaum, supra note 2.
22. Id.
23. Nicole Huberfeld, Where There Is a Right, There Must Be a Remedy - Even in Medicaid,
102 KY. L.J. 327, 329 (2013).
24. Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and
Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 419–20 (2008).
25. Cartwright-Smith & Rosenbaum, supra note 2.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A) (2012).
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to these new services. 27 That freedom has only been limited in one context:
Medicaid managed care. 28 Managed care plans allow a state to contract with a
limited selection of health care providers to deliver care to plan enrollees. 29
Patients’ freedom of choice must be limited to some degree for these programs
to work.
Despite that limitation, Congress has explicitly preserved patients’ freedom
of choice in the context of family planning services. 30 Thus, Medicaid
beneficiaries have the right to freely choose among qualified and willing family
planning providers, even if participating in a Medicaid managed care plan, and
that right cannot be altered by the state. 31 This illustrates Congress’s pledge to
allow Medicaid beneficiaries unfettered access to the provider of their choice for
sensitive services without fear of state intervention. 32
This protection, however, has been challenged by the recent trend of states
terminating Medicaid provider agreements with Planned Parenthood. 33 It begs
the question: how can Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision be enforced
against noncompliant states?
B.

HHS has Limited Enforcement Power

Unfortunately, HHS is reluctant to use its enforcement power to force states
to comply with Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision. The Medicaid Act
directly addresses what should happen if a state fails to adhere to its own plan. 34
It permits the Secretary of HHS to withdraw full or partial funding from states
that fail to comply with the required provisions of the Act. 35 This remedy only
comes into effect after the Secretary has given the state reasonable notice and
opportunity for a hearing. 36
This enforcement mechanism, however, does nothing to help the Medicaid
patient who has been denied access to the provider of her choice. In fact, the
withdrawal of funding only serves to exacerbate her problem. Not only has her
right to the provider of her choice been violated, but also now the state likely
lacks the funds necessary to provide other needed services. The patient’s

27. MACPAC, supra note 19; Cartwright-Smith & Rosenbaum, supra note 2.
28. Cartwright-Smith & Rosenbaum, supra note 2.
29. Medicaid Managed Care Market Tracker, KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/
data-collection/medicaid-managed-care-market-tracker/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2018).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(B) (2012).
31. See id.
32. Cartwright-Smith & Rosenbaum, supra note 2.
33. See Roxana Hegeman, Court: Kansas Can’t Cut Medicaid Funds to Planned Parenthood,
ABC NEWS (Feb 21, 2018), http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/court-kansas-cut-medicaidfunds-planned-parenthood-53260383.
34. Huberfeld, supra note 23, at 327.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012).
36. Id.
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problem has doubled. She cannot choose her provider, nor can she obtain other
necessary services. Accordingly, the withdrawal of funding has been deemed the
“nuclear option” because of the harm it would cause to program enrollees, and
HHS has never seriously considered employing it. 37
Although HHS has some authority to affect how states administer their
Medicaid programs, it does not help those beneficiaries who have had their
freedom of choice violated.
C. The Medicaid Statute Provides Limited Remedies for Patients and
Providers
Furthermore, the Medicaid Act does not provide a sufficient remedy for
patients within the statute itself. 38 Although it does provide administrative
procedures for patients and providers in certain circumstances, they do not
adequately address concerns arising from the violation of a patient’s freedom of
choice.
The Act requires states to provide program beneficiaries with the
opportunity for a fair hearing if their claim for medical assistance is denied or
not acted upon with reasonable promptness. 39 This includes any action, or
inaction, that affects the person’s eligibility during the initial application process
or the termination of a particular medical service covered by the program. 40 The
two main issues covered by these hearings include applicants appealing the
denial of their eligibility and beneficiaries seeking review for the decision to
deny or discontinue a particular service. 41 HHS, however, has specified that
states are not obligated to grant such a hearing where the only issue is a state law
requiring an automatic change adversely affecting some or all beneficiaries. 42
Thus, beneficiaries challenging a state amendment to its Medicaid plan are not
entitled to a hearing at all if they fail to raise a factual dispute regarding their
eligibility for coverage. 43 Accordingly, the fair hearing process does absolutely
nothing to help the patient whose provider has been excluded from the Medicaid
program.
For example, take a Medicaid patient who sees the same physician at a
Planned Parenthood clinic for contraceptive counseling each year. Unbeknownst
to her, the state decides to cancel its provider contract with the clinic, and she
can no longer obtain the needed services from the provider of her choice. Her
claim for contraceptive counseling from that provider will be denied. The patient
37. See Huberfeld, supra note 23, at 327.
38. See id. at 328.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2018).
40. MaryBeth Musumeci, A Guide to the Medicaid Appeals Process, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 6
(2012), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8287.pdf.
41. Id.
42. 42 C.F.R. § 431.220(b) (2018).
43. Davis v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 253 (2d Cir. 2016).
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can attempt to appeal the denial, but she will be unsuccessful. Although the state
amended its Medicaid plan, which adversely affected some beneficiaries, the
patient’s Medicaid eligibility has not been altered in any way. Thus, the state is
not required to offer the patient a fair hearing at all. 44 If the patient is somehow
able to secure a hearing, her appeal is still likely to fail. Her Medicaid eligibility
is still intact, and the state did not terminate contraceptive counseling all
together. 45 The patient still has access to the services she needs—so long as she
obtains it from a different provider. This is exactly the type of result the freedom
of choice provision was added to prevent. She has clearly lost her freedom to
choose her health care provider, but none of the Act’s administrative remedies
help her regain that choice. Thus, the Medicaid program itself offers no recourse
to patients trying to secure their right to choose.
Furthermore, the Act requires states to provide an appeals process to those
providers that have been excluded from a state’s Medicaid program. 46 Thus, if a
state terminates its provider agreement with a particular provider or group of
providers, they have the right to appeal the decision. 47 This right to appeal,
however, only extends to affected providers. 48 The patient cannot appeal the
exclusion on behalf of her provider. 49 She is left hoping her provider appeals the
exclusion and that the appeal is granted. There is no affirmative action she can
take to ensure her freedom of choice is protected. Therefore again, this remedy
is insufficient to address violations of a patient’s freedom of choice.
Although there are two administrative mechanisms within the Medicaid Act
patients and providers can utilize to challenge agency decisions, these processes
do not adequately address those situations when a patient’s freedom of choice
has been violated.
D. The Supremacy Clause is not the Source of any Federal Right
Because HHS and the Medicaid Act offer no remedy for patients when their
freedom of choice has been violated, federal court is the only forum where
patients can seek relief. Private individuals have often gone to federal court to
obtain relief when they are being harmed by state actions that are inconsistent
with federal law. 50 Medicaid beneficiaries have enforced various provisions of
the Medicaid Act against state violators in federal court under the Supremacy
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

42 C.F.R. § 431.220(b) (2018).
See Musumeci, supra note 40.
42 C.F.R. § 1002.213 (2018).
Id.
See id.
See id.
JANE PERKINS, UPDATE ON PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE MEDICAID ACT: THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND 42 U.S.C. § 1983, NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM 1 (2014),
http://www.healthlaw.org/publications/browse-all-publications/Issue-brief-medicaid-supremacyclause#.WdAdWRNSzok
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Clause or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983). 51 Recently, however, the Supreme Court
foreclosed the use of the Supremacy Clause to challenge state actions that
conflict with federal law. 52 Accordingly, Medicaid beneficiaries are left with
only one option for federal enforcement when their freedom of choice has been
violated: challenge the state action in federal court under § 1983. Access to
federal court is vital for Medicaid patients, particularly when their freedom of
choice has been violated by the state, and these types of fights are more suited
for federal court.
Thus, a federal forum is more appropriate to resolve these disputes. As
discussed below, many Medicaid provisions have been enforced through § 1983.
III. THE PATH TO A SUCCESSFUL CLAIM UNDER § 1983
Title 42, Section 1983 of the U.S. Code is one of America’s oldest federal
laws, dating back to the Reconstruction Era. 53 The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress … 54

It effectively offers an express cause of action to individuals when a state actor
deprives them of rights guaranteed under federal law. 55 Many claimants file
§ 1983 lawsuits, including recipients of various public benefits. 56 There are a
plethora of cases regarding disability benefits, 57 veterans’ benefits, 58 retirement

51. Jane Perkins, Pin the Tail on the Donkey: Beneficiary Enforcement of the Medicaid Act
over Time, 9 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 207, 208 (2016).
52. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383–84 (2015) (explaining
the Supremacy Clause is not the “source” of any federal rights and “certainly” does not create a
cause of action, as it only instructs courts house to deal with conflicting state and federal laws).
53. Huberfeld, supra note 23, at 331.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (2018).
55. Perkins, supra note 51, at 217.
56. Other claimants include alleged victims of police misconduct; prisoners; present and
former public employees; and property owners. Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation, FED.
JUD. CTR. 3 (2014), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2014/Section-1983-Litigation-3D-FJCSchwartz-2014.pdf.
57. See, e.g., Miller v. Tex. Tech. Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 421 F.3d 342, 352 n.3 (5th Cir.
2005) (alleging failure to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled students); Cryder v.
Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 176 (11th Cir. 1994) (regarding termination of disability benefits in
accordance with the state’s worker’s compensation law).
58. See, e.g., Mehrkens v. Blank, 556 F.3d 865, 866–67 (8th Cir. 2009) (claiming the
Department of Veteran’s Affairs withheld treatment owed as part of veterans’ benefits); Mathes v.
Hornbarger, 821 F.2d 439, 440 (7th Cir. 1987) (regarding Veterans Affairs educational benefits).
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benefits, 59 and unemployment compensation benefits. 60 These cases typically
present in three ways: (1) an individual is denied certain federal benefits; 61 (2) a
state enacts a law limiting federal benefits to some degree; 62 or (3) a state does
not provide federal benefits in a manner consistent with federal law. 63
Historically, low-income individuals have greatly relied upon § 1983 to ensure
federal rights enshrined by Congress are fully realized. 64 The enforcement of
various provisions of the Medicaid Act has been no exception. 65
The Supreme Court has held patients may bring § 1983 actions to force
states to comply with certain provisions of the Medicaid Act. 66 In Maine v.
Thiboutot, the Court stated § 1983 applies to alleged violations of federal
statutes, not just violations of the Constitution. 67 The phrase “and laws” in
§ 1983 was construed to cover any federal law, not merely civil rights or equal
protection laws as had been previously assumed. 68 Shortly thereafter in Wilder
v. Virgina Hospital Association, the Court concluded a provision of the
Medicaid Act could be enforced in federal court through § 1983. 69 This decision
effectively pushed open the courthouse doors to Medicaid litigation against
states. 70
Subsequent jurisprudence has clarified the requirements for a successful
§ 1983 claim. First, a federal statute is only enforceable under § 1983 if the
plaintiff asserts a violation of a federal right, not just a violation of a federal
law. 71 As noted by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone, the
determination of whether a statutory provision creates a federal right turns on a
three factors. 72 Frequently referred to as the “Blessing test,” the provision must
(1) be intended to benefit the plaintiff; (2) be written with sufficient clarity such
that a court can enforce it; and (3) impose a binding obligation on states. 73 When
59. See, e.g., Parella v. Ret. Bd. of R.I. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1999)
(concerning retirement benefits awarded to retired Rhode Island legislators and their beneficiaries).
60. See, e.g., Zambrano v. Reinert, 291 F.3d 964, 966 (7th Cir. 2002) (concerning an employee
that had been denied unemployment compensation benefits in accordance with state law).
61. See, e.g., Mathes, 821 F.2d at 440 (regarding Veterans Affairs educational benefits).
62. See, e.g., Zambrano, 291 F.3d at 966 (concerning an employee that had been denied
unemployment compensation benefits in accordance with state law).
63. See, e.g., Miller v. Tex. Tech. Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 421 F.3d 342, 352 n.3 (5th Cir.
2005) (alleging failure to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled students).
64. Perkins, supra note 51, at 217.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 223.
67. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).
68. Id. at 6.
69. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990) (holding the Boren Amendment
gave health care providers an enforceable right to reasonable reimbursement rates).
70. Huberfeld, supra note 23, at 333.
71. Schwartz, supra note 56, at 75.
72. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997).
73. Id.
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all three factors are present, the right is presumed to be enforceable. 74 That
presumption, however, can be overcome by demonstrating Congress expressly
foreclosed a remedy under § 1983 in the statute itself or by creating an individual
enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under
§ 1983. 75 This fairly straightforward analytical framework has been applied to
Medicaid’s various provisions with consistent results. 76
A.

Provision Must be Intended to Benefit the Plaintiff

The first prong of the Blessing test requires the provision at issue be intended
to benefit the plaintiff. 77 The key inquiry is whether a specific statutory
provision, not the legislation as a whole, gives rise to rights. 78 Courts conduct a
two-part analysis to determine whether this prong has been met.
First, as noted in Gonzaga University v. Doe, only “unambiguously
conferred” rights can support a cause of action under § 1983. 79 Section 1983
provides a remedy for the deprivation of rights secured by the laws of the United
States. 80 Therefore, it can only be used to enforce rights, not such broad or vague
concepts as benefits or interests. 81 For a right to be “unambiguously conferred,”
the text and structure of a statute must indicate Congress intended to create new
individual rights. 82
Second, the provision must have an individual rather than aggregate focus,
because provisions with an aggregate focus cannot give rise to individual federal
rights. 83 For example, statutory provisions mandating “substantial compliance”
with federal legislation have an aggregate focus because they are typically only
concerned with system-wide performance of a state’s program. 84 Moreover,
provisions speaking only in terms of institutional policy or practice also have an
aggregate focus because they are not designed to address the needs of any
particular person. 85
Following these principles, the Third Circuit held a Medicaid provision
requiring state plans to provide medical assistance with “reasonable promptness
to all eligible individuals” clearly satisfied the first prong of the Blessing test. 86

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Perkins, supra note 51, at 219.
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 342; see also Perkins, supra note 51, at 219.
Perkins, supra note 51, at 222–24.
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340.
Id. at 342.
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 285.
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added).
Id.
Gonzaga, 520 U.S. at 288.
Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 189 (3d Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
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The provision was prefaced with mandatory language—a state plan “must”
provide—which the court explained unambiguously conferred the rights
asserted. 87 Further, the court explained the provision does not focus on the
regulated entity; it focuses on the individuals protected. 88 It does not describe a
type of policy goal, but rather it describes a specific requirement guaranteed to
eligible individuals. 89 The court’s analysis regarding this Medicaid provision
was made “without difficulty.” 90
Other courts have made similar conclusions without difficulty, as there are
no splits among the circuits when determining whether a particular Medicaid
provision confers rights to individuals. 91 This bodes well for any future
Medicaid beneficiaries hoping to seek redress in federal court.
B.

Provision Must be Written with Sufficient Clarity that a Court can
Enforce It

After it has been established the provision at issue does confer a right to the
individual plaintiff, the court then turns to examine the characteristic of that
right. 92 The right protected by the provision cannot be so “vague and
amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. 93 In Wilder,
the Supreme Court held a Medicaid provision requiring state plans to provide
for payment of covered services at rates “reasonable and adequate” to meet the
costs of such care was not too vague and amorphous to be judicially
enforceable. 94 Although states had significant flexibility to calculate the rates,
the Court explained such flexibility did not render the provision unenforceable
by a court. 95 It merely affects the standard under which a court would review
whether the rates are in compliance with the provision. 96
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit concluded a Medicaid provision
requiring state plans to include “reasonable standards” for determining
eligibility and the extent of medical assistance was too vague and amorphous. 97
The provision did not provide any instruction for how to interpret or implement
those reasonable standards. 98 Therefore, such a right would require a court to

87. Id. at 190.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 189.
91. See Perkins, supra note 51, at 224.
92. Id. at 219.
93. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (2002) (quoting Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 432 (1987)).
94. Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502–03, 519 (1990).
95. Id. at 519.
96. Id.
97. Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2006).
98. Id. at 1162–63.
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delve into the medical necessity of particular types of care, which is exactly the
type of judicially unenforceable rights contemplated by Blessing. 99
Accordingly, Medicaid provisions granting substantial discretion to states
are not too vague and amorphous so long as they create standards the court can
analyze. The standard can be created by the state or some other agency, but it is
necessary to allow a court to enforce the right guaranteed by the provision at
issue. Thus, to build a successful Medicaid claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must
start by asserting an unambiguously conferred right that is not too vague and
amorphous for a court to enforce it.
C. Provision Imposes a Binding Obligation on the State
Finally, for a statutory provision to enjoy the presumption of enforceability
under § 1983, it must also impose a binding obligation on the states. 100 The
provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory rather
than precatory terms. 101
In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court concluded a particular provision of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 merely
expressed a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment rather than a
binding obligation. 102 The provision at issue was not included in the list of
conditions for the receipt of federal funds under the Act. 103 Instead, the provision
was included in a list of congressional findings that persons with developmental
disabilities have a right to “appropriate treatment” in the “least restrictive”
environment. 104 The Court explained Congress often uses legislation to indicate
preferences that serve to nudge states in a preferred direction. 105 Thus, the
provision was merely the expression of a policy goal to provide developmentally
disabled citizens with better care. 106
Conversely, in Wilder, the Supreme Court held a Medicaid provision
requiring that state plans “must” provide for payment of hospital services
according to reasonable rates was enforceable. 107 The Court compared this
language to that of the provision at issue in Pennhurst and concluded it
succinctly sets forth a congressional command, which is wholly uncharacteristic
of a mere policy suggestion or nudge. 108 Furthermore, the Secretary of HHS

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id. at 1163.
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997).
Id. (emphasis added).
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 5, 19 (1981).
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 22–23.
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 512 (1990).
Id.
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could withhold funds if the state did not comply with the provision. 109 Thus, the
provision was indeed cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms. 110
Taken together, Medicaid provisions can be enforced under § 1983 so long
as the claim asserts unambiguously conferred rights that are not too vague and
amorphous and impose a binding obligation on the state. Once those three things
have been established, the federal right is presumptively enforceable. 111
D. Presumption can be Overcome by the Presence of a Comprehensive
Enforcement Scheme
The final hurdle Medicaid beneficiaries must overcome to enforce violations
of the Act comes in the form of a statutory defense. Even if all three parts of the
Blessing test are met, enforcement through § 1983 may still be foreclosed if the
statute containing the specific provision creates a comprehensive enforcement
scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement. 112
The Supreme Court has only found a comprehensive administrative scheme
to preclude enforceability in three cases. 113 In those cases, the Court explained
the statutes at issue contained more restrictive remedies than § 1983 and
contained private judicial remedies for the rights violated. 114 Therefore, in those
situations, the Court concluded Congress did not intend to leave open a more
expansive remedy under § 1983. 115
For Medicaid, however, the Court held in Wilder that the Act does not have
a comprehensive enforcement scheme that would foreclose reliance on
§ 1983. 116 The Act authorizes the Secretary of HHS to withhold approval of state
plans or to withhold funds from states not in compliance with federal
requirements. 117 Further, the Act requires states to implement administrative
procedures whereby individuals can obtain review of state actions affecting
Medicaid. 118 The Court explained neither the Secretary’s authority nor the
states’ administrative procedures are sufficiently comprehensive to suggest
individuals cannot rely on § 1983 to enforce various provisions of the Medicaid
Act. 119 The Secretary’s powers are too generalized and state administrative
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Id.
Id.
See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997).
Id.
Schwartz, supra note 56, at 78–80.
City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 121 (2005).
Id.
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 521 (1990).
Id.
See id. at 523.
Id. at 522–23.
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procedures too limited to conclude Congress intended to remove the availability
of private enforcement in federal court. 120
Therefore, it is clear that Medicaid cases making it to this final part of the
§ 1983 analysis are likely to succeed. Between 2002 and 2006, twenty-five
different Medicaid provisions were reviewed by federal courts, and over half
were found to be enforceable. 121 This is particularly encouraging for Medicaid
beneficiaries as states continue tinkering with state plans to get around various
federal requirements. 122
IV. FREEDOM OF CHOICE PROVISION AND § 1983
Federal courts have applied the Blessing test to § 1983 claims in the
Medicaid context on numerous occasions. 123 Consistent with the Supreme
Court’s teaching, appellate courts review § 1983 enforceability on a “provisionby-provision basis.” 124
Six circuit courts of appeals have examined Medicaid’s freedom of choice
provision, which states: “[A]ny individual eligible for medical assistance … may
obtain such assistance from any institution, agency, community pharmacy, or
person, qualified to perform the service or services required who undertakes to
provide him such services[.]” 125
All but the Does court from the Eighth Circuit found the provision affords
Medicaid patients a private right of action under § 1983. 126 The other five courts
of appeals utilized the Blessing test for assessing the § 1983 claims, emphasizing
different parts of the test to reach their conclusions.
A.

Provision Must Benefit the Plaintiff

Only those provisions that confer a federal right to the plaintiff can be
enforced under § 1983. 127 First, Medicaid patients are the obvious intended
beneficiaries of the freedom of choice provision. 128 The provision states any

120. Id.
121. Perkins, supra note 51, at 223.
122. See generally Harris Meyer, Judge Blocks Kentucky’s Medicaid Work Requirement, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (June 29, 2018), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180629/NEWS/1806
29902/judge-blocks-kentuckys-medicaid-work-requirement.
123. Perkins, supra note 51, at 222.
124. Id. at 223 (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 342 (1997)).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)(A) (2012).
126. Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc.
v. Ind. State Dep’t Health, 699 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2012); Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v.
Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2013); Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862
F.3d 445, 457 (5th Cir. 2017); Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Andersen, 882 F.3d 1205, 1224 (10th
Cir. 2018). But see Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 2017).
127. See discussion infra Section III.A.
128. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc., 699 F.3d at 975.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2018]

STRETCHING ARMSTRONG

229

Medicaid eligible person may obtain medical assistance from any institution,
agency, or person qualified to perform that service. 129 Further, as noted by the
Tenth Circuit, Congress enacted another statute that insulates family planning
services from Medicaid managed care programs, which assures covered patients
have an unfettered choice of provider for family planning services. 130 Thus,
Congress clearly intended to grant a specific class of beneficiaries—Medicaideligible patients—a right to obtain medical care from the qualified provider of
their choice. 131
Second, the statute gives any individual eligible for medical assistance a free
choice of provider for that assistance. 132 As explained by the Sixth Circuit, this
is the kind of individually focused terminology that unambiguously confers an
individual entitlement under the law. 133
Finally, the individualized language of the provision does not create an
aggregate plan requirement. 134 Instead, it establishes a personal right to which
all Medicaid patients are entitled. 135 The provision is unmistakably phrased in
terms of the persons benefited. 136
Taken together, Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision clearly meets the
first prong of the three-part test used for assessing claims under § 1983.
B.

Provision Must be Written with Sufficient Clarity for a Court to Enforce It

Once it has been established Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision does
confer rights to Medicaid patients, courts must determine whether that right is
judicially administrable. 137 The Ninth Circuit focused its analysis on this part of
the test and concluded the provision does supply concrete and objective
standards of enforcement. 138 Any Medicaid recipient is free to choose any
provider as long as two criteria are met: (1) the provider is qualified to perform
the requested services, and (2) the provider agrees to provide such services. 139
The court explained these are objective criteria that are well within the judicial
competence to apply. 140 They do not require courts to engage in any balancing
of competing concerns or subjective policy arguments. 141 Courts must only
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Id.
Andersen, 882 F.3d at 1226.
Id.; Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc., 699 F.3d at 975.
Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461 (2006).
Id.
Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc., 699 F.3d at 974.
Id.
Id.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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inquire whether an individual was denied the choice of a qualified and willing
provider, and the answer to this question is likely to be readily apparent. 142
Determining whether a provider is qualified may require more factual
development, but the term ‘qualified’ is tethered to an objective benchmark:
qualified to perform the requested services. 143 Courts can make that
determination by drawing on descriptions of the requested services; state
licensing requirements; the provider’s credentials, licenses, and experience; and
expert testimony regarding such appropriate credentials. 144 This is no different
from the sorts of qualification or expertise assessments courts routinely make in
other contexts. 145 Thus, the freedom of choice provision is not so “vague and
amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. 146
C. Provision Imposes a Binding Obligation on the State
Finally, the freedom of choice provision must impose a binding obligation
on the state. 147 The freedom of choice provision is plainly couched in mandatory
terms. 148 It says all states “must provide” in their Medicaid plans that
beneficiaries may obtain medical care from any qualified and willing
provider. 149 The statute is not merely a directive to a federal agency. 150 Rather,
it requires state plans to allow Medicaid eligible individuals to obtain
reimbursable medical services from the provider of their choice. 151
D. Presumption can be Overcome by the Presence of a Comprehensive
Enforcement Scheme
If all three parts of the test are met, the federal right is presumed to be
enforceable through § 1983. 152 Yet, enforcement through § 1983 may still be
foreclosed if the statute creates a comprehensive enforcement scheme
incompatible with individual enforcement. 153 The Seventh Circuit explained
nothing in the Medicaid Act suggests Congress specifically foreclosed a remedy

142. Id. (quoting Harris v. Olszweski, 442, F.3d 456, 462 (6th Cir. 2006)).
143. Betlach, 727 F.3d at 967. Compare Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862
F.3d 445, 461 (5th Cir. 2017) (explaining patients do not have a right to choose from unqualified
providers).
144. Betlach, 727 F.3d at 968.
145. Id.
146. Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Andersen, 882 F.3d 1205, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 2018).
147. See discussion infra Section III.C.
148. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Ind. State Dep’t Health, 699 F.3d 962, 974 (7th Cir.
2012).
149. Id.
150. Andersen, 882 F.3d at 1228.
151. Id.
152. See discussion infra Section III.D.
153. Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 461 (6th Cir. 2006).
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under § 1983. 154 Although the Secretary of HHS can shut off state funding, that
is not a comprehensive enforcement scheme. 155 The administrative approval
process for plan amendments does not provide an avenue for beneficiaries to
vindicate their freedom of choice rights. 156 Moreover, Congress did not provide
a means of private redress within the Medicaid Act, and private enforcement
under § 1983 in no way interferes with the Secretary’s prerogative to enforce
compliance with particular provisions using her administrative authority. 157
Thus, based on Supreme Court precedent, the Medicaid Act’s administrative
scheme is not sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate a congressional intent
to withdraw the private remedy under § 1983. 158
Accordingly, together, a majority of circuit courts that have analyzed
whether Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision confers a right enforceable
under § 1983 have found that it does. 159
V. DOES V. GILLESPIE
In 2017, the Eighth Circuit addressed whether the freedom of choice
provision conferred a private right enforceable under § 1983. 160 In 2015, the
Governor of Arkansas directed the Arkansas Department of Human Services to
terminate its Medicaid provider agreements with Planned Parenthood. 161 The
Governor’s directive came on the heels of the publication of videos purporting
to show Planned Parenthood employees discussing the sale of fetal tissue for
profit. 162
Planned Parenthood declined to file an administrative appeal with the
state. 163 Rather, Planned Parenthood identified three affected patients, and those
patients sued the Department’s Director seeking a preliminary injunction to
prevent the termination of the provider agreements. 164 The plaintiffs claimed the
Department violated Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision when it excluded
Planned Parenthood from its Medicaid program for reasons unrelated to its
154. Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Ind. State Dep’t Health, 699 F.3d 962, 974 (7th Cir.
2012).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 975.
157. Id.
158. Planned Parenthood of Kan. v. Andersen, 882 F.3d 1205, 1228–29 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 522 (1990)).
159. Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc.,
699 F.3d at 968; Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2013);
Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee, 862 F.3d 445, 457 (5th Cir. 2017); Andersen, 882
F.3d at 1224. But see Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 2017).
160. Does, 867 F.3d at 1037.
161. Id. at 1038.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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fitness to provide medical services. 165 The plaintiffs claimed the freedom of
choice provision creates a judicially enforceable right that can be enforced under
§ 1983. 166 The district court granted the preliminary injunction, concluding the
free choice of provider provision did create a private right enforceable under
§ 1983. 167 The Department appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit. 168
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit found the freedom of choice provision does
not create an unambiguously conferred right and Medicaid has a comprehensive
enforcement scheme that forecloses enforcement through § 1983. 169
A.

Provision Must Benefit the Plaintiff

Rather than assess the freedom of choice provision in isolation to determine
if it creates an enforceable right, the Eighth Circuit broke with Supreme Court
precedent and analyzed the entire statutory scheme as a whole. 170 The court
explained the focus of the Medicaid Act is two steps removed from the interests
of the patients seeking services from a Medicaid provider. 171 The Secretary of
HHS approves state plans that fulfill “conditions specified in subsection (a),”
which includes some eighty-three conditions—including the freedom of choice
provision. 172 Thus, the statute—as a whole—is phrased as a directive to the
federal agency charged with approving state Medicaid plans. 173 The court
reasoned it is not a conferral of rights upon the beneficiaries, because it does not
focus on particular individuals. 174 Although a subsidiary provision ultimately
benefits particular individuals, the court explained statutes phrased as directives
to federal agencies typically do not confer enforceable rights on the
individuals. 175
Furthermore, the court concluded the provision has an aggregate focus. 176
The Secretary is directed to discontinue payments to a state if she finds the
failure to comply substantially with the conditions specified in subsection (a). 177
The Eighth Circuit previously held statutes that link funding to “substantial”
compliance with its conditions counsels against the creation of individual
165. Does, 867 F.3d at 1038.
166. Id. In reaching its decision, the District Court relied on those opinions from the other
circuit courts of appeals. Planned Parenthood Ark. & E. Okla. v. Selig, No. 4:15-CV-00566-KGB,
2015 WL 13307022, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 2, 2015).
167. Does, 867 F.3d at 1038.
168. Id. at 1039.
169. Id. at 1041–42.
170. Id. at 1040.
171. Id. at 1041.
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (2012); Does, 867 F.3d at 1040.
173. Does, 867 F.3d at 1041.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1042.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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rights. 178 Focusing on substantial compliance is tantamount to focusing on the
aggregate practices of the funding recipient. 179 Thus, the court concluded the
freedom of choice provision was part of a substantial compliance funding
condition, which suggested it had an aggregate focus. 180
Taken together, the court concluded Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision
does not create an enforceable federal right under § 1983. 181
B.

Presumption can be Overcome by the Presence of a Comprehensive
Enforcement Scheme

Although the inquiry could have ended there, the court goes on to analyze
whether the Medicaid Act has a comprehensive enforcement scheme
incompatible with individual enforcement through § 1983. 182 The court noted
Congress expressly conferred another means of enforcing compliance with the
freedom of choice provision—the withholding of federal funds by the
Secretary. 183 Further, providers have the right to appeal an exclusion from the
Medicaid program. 184 Because other sections of the Medicaid Act provide
mechanisms to enforce the provision at issue, it is reasonable to conclude
Congress did not intend to create an enforceable right for individual patients
under § 1983. 185 Additionally, the court explained it would “result in a curious
system” if a patient could litigate the qualifications of a provider in federal court
at the same time the provider is going through the administrative appeals
process. 186 It could result in parallel ligation and inconsistent results, providing
further support for the court’s conclusion that the Medicaid Act had foreclosed
private enforcement through § 1983. 187
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit became the first appellate court to hold
Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision does not confer an individual federal
right enforceable under § 1983. 188

178. Does, 867 F.3d at 1042 (citing Midwest Foster Case & Adoption Ass’n v. Kincade, 712
F.3d 1190 (8th Cir. 2013)).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1042–43.
181. Id. at 1041.
182. Id. at 1041–42.
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2018); Does, 867 F.3d at 1041.
184. Does, 867 F.3d at 1041.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 1037.
188. Id. at 1041.
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IV. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT IGNORED BINDING SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT TO
REACH ITS CONCLUSION IN DOES V. GILLESPIE
The Eighth Circuit’s opinion and analysis is concerning for a couple reasons.
First, the court ignored established Supreme Court precedent as to how the
Blessing test must be applied. Second, the court heavily relied on dicta from the
Supreme Court to reach its conclusion. Accordingly, the court in Does relied on
dicta from the Supreme Court to re-write well-established, long applied § 1983
analysis for Medicaid cases, setting up a circuit split and positioning Does to be
the case that gives the Supreme Court the opportunity to potentially close the
door on all §1983 private rights of action in Medicaid cases.
A.

The Supreme Court’s Analysis of § 1983 in Wilder is Still Binding
Precedent

In concluding the freedom of choice provision does not create an
enforceable right under § 1983, the Eighth Circuit heavily relied on dicta from a
recent case from the Supreme Court—Armstrong v. Exceptional Child
Center. 189 There, the plaintiffs sued under the Supremacy Clause, not § 1983,
and the Court ultimately determined the Supremacy Clause did not grant them a
private right of action. 190 The Court goes on examine the claim under the § 1983
framework, and, as the Court noted, the assertion of rights under § 1983 was not
at issue in the case. 191 Because the Court’s discussion of § 1983 was not
necessary to the result regarding the Supremacy Clause, it is considered dicta. 192
This distinction bears great importance, as holdings set binding precedent,
influencing future decisions of lower courts, while dicta has no similar
precedential value. 193 The reliance on holdings rather than dicta serves as the
backbone of the U.S. judicial system, as courts rely on holdings to resolve cases
and make law. 194 By promulgating law through dicta that looks like a holding,
judges exercise lawmaking power they do not possess. 195 Further, by accepting
dicta as binding law, judges fail to discharge their responsibility to resolve cases
based on the precise question at hand. 196

189. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct 1378, 1383 (2015).
190. Id. at 1384.
191. Id. at 1387.
192. Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
219, 223 (2010).
193. James Khun et al., Holding versus Dicta: Divided Control of Opinion Content on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 70 POL. RES. Q. 257, 259 (2017).
194. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 956
(2005).
195. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1249, 1250 (2006).
196. Id.
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s discussion of § 1983 in Armstrong does
not constitute binding precedent. Still, the Eighth Circuit opted to ignore actual
binding precedent set forth in Wilder and relied on the assertions from
Armstrong anyway.
First, in assessing the intended beneficiary of the freedom of choice
provision, the Eighth Circuit stated the focus of the Medicaid Act is two steps
removed from the interests of patients seeking services from Medicaid
providers. 197 The court quoted directly from Armstrong’s discussion of § 1983
and concluded “[i]t is phrased as a directive to the federal agency charged with
approving state Medicaid plans, not as a conferral of the right to sue upon the
beneficiaries of the State’s decision to participate in Medicaid.” 198
As previously explained, this language from Armstrong is dicta and does not
constitute precedent that must be followed by lower courts. Further, and
potentially more important, the § 1983 discussion in Armstrong is not signed on
by a majority of the justices. 199 Justice Scalia penned the Armstrong opinion, but
only Justices Alito, Roberts, and Thomas joined his discussion of Medicaid
claims arising under § 1983. 200 Justice Breyer joined the majority regarding
Armstrong’s actual holding, but he declined to so join the discussion regarding
§ 1983. 201 Not only is this discussion considered dicta, Justice Scalia was unable
to obtain a majority of justices to agree with his stance regarding § 1983 and
Medicaid. Accordingly, it is far from the type of binding precedent the Eighth
Circuit would be obligated to follow.
Second, the Eighth Circuit held the freedom of choice provision had an
aggregate rather than individual focus, because it is merely part of a substantial
compliance regime. 202 As noted by the Supreme Court in Blessing and many
decisions since, courts are required to assess the Medicaid provision at issue in
isolation. 203 The Eighth Circuit ignored this axiom and opted instead to assess
the entire statutory scheme as a whole. 204 The court emphasized the Secretary
can discontinue payments to states if he finds a state fails to comply substantially
with all the provisions listed in § 1396a, which includes the freedom of choice
provision. 205 In Wilder, the Supreme Court held a substantial compliance
regime—on its own—could not suggest an aggregate focus. 206 The Court in its
discussion of § 1983 in Armstrong stated the broad application of Wilder should

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Does v. Gillespie, 867 F.3d 1034, 1041 (8th Cir. 2017).
Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1387 (2015)).
Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1387.
See generally id. at 1378.
Id. at 1387–88.
Does, 867 F.3d at 1042.
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 342 (1997); see also Perkins, supra note 51, at 223.
Does, 867 F.3d at 1041.
Id. at 1042–43.
Id. (citing Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 522 (1990)).
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be narrowed to cover only those ambiguously conferred rights, but it did not
overturn Wilder nor did it express disagreement with its conclusion regarding
substantial compliance regimes. 207 It merely clarified exactly when the Wilder
test should be applied. 208 In fact, the Supreme Court has routinely relied on the
principles established in Wilder in its subsequent decisions applying the Blessing
test. 209
The Eighth Circuit, however, interpreted Armstrong’s narrowing language
as overruling Wilder. 210 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit completely ignored
Wilder in light of Armstrong and held Medicaid’s substantial compliance
regime—alone—suggested it has an aggregate focus. 211 Yet again, the Eighth
Circuit treated dicta as binding precedent. On this issue, however, it went further
by replacing actual binding precedent with dicta. In so doing, the Eighth Circuit
exercised lawmaking power it does not possess and created bad, flawed law
regarding Medicaid claims arising under § 1983. 212
B.

The Eighth Circuit Ignored Settled Principles of Statutory Interpretation
Regarding § 1983 Claims

As established by the Supreme Court, § 1983 claims must be broken down
into “manageable analytic bites” in order to be properly assessed. 213 Between
2002 and 2016, federal courts have reviewed twenty-five Medicaid provisions,
and they were all assessed on a provision-by-provision basis. 214 In Does,
however, the Eighth Circuit ignored this analytical framework and chose to look
at the Medicaid Act as a whole. 215 Although statutes are normally interpreted as
a whole, 216 § 1983 claims require courts to focus on the specific statutory
provision at issue. 217 Thus, the Eighth Circuit ignored binding precedent—
again—and applied the wrong test for statutory interpretation of § 1983 claims.
C. Implications of the Does v. Gillespie Opinion
The Eighth Circuit’s holding in Does v. Gillespie is certainly concerning for
Medicaid patients hoping to enforce the freedom of choice provision through
§ 1983. Potentially more concerning, however, is the way in which the court
reached its conclusion. The court misinterpreted and ignored binding precedent.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1396 n.* (2015).
See id.
See Huberfeld, supra note 23, at 336.
Does, 867 F.3d at 1040.
Id. at 1042.
See Leval, supra note 195 at 1250, 1255.
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 342 (1997).
Perkins, supra note 51, at 223 (citing Blessing, 520 U.S. at 342).
Does, 867 F.3d at 1043.
Id.
Blessing, 520 U.S. at 342.
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When faced with as much § 1983 precedent as currently exists, the Eighth
Circuit managed to miss the forest for the trees. It latched on to dicta from the
Supreme Court, ultimately leading it to be the only appellate court to hold
Medicaid’s freedom of choice provision does not confer an individual right
enforceable under § 1983. Thus, a circuit split was born.
The biggest concern for Medicaid advocates moving forward is the potential
for the Supreme Court to resolve this circuit split against Medicaid patients
seeking to enforce the freedom of choice provision. Although Does relied on
dicta, the language still represents views held by some of the Supreme Court
justices. We do not know when or if those views will come to represent a
majority on the Court, but it may happen sooner than anticipated now that
Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh have joined the bench. 218 The Supreme Court
could remove the ability for any Medicaid recipients to enforce various
provisions of the Act through § 1983, thereby removing the one avenue for
recourse currently available to Medicaid recipients.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court declined to resolve the split among
the circuit courts. 219 Rather than expressly disavow the Eighth Circuit’s
improper analysis and conclusions, the opinion remains undisturbed. For now,
claimants can still rely on § 1983 to secure their freedom of choice—so long as
they are outside the reach of the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction. It is unclear how
long the Supreme Court will allow this divergence in the law to exist, but
hopefully it can and will be resolved in favor of Medicaid recipients. The right
to choose the provider of your choice is vital, and federal courts are the only
forum in which to have that right protected.
VII. CONCLUSION
Medicaid has been in place for more than fifty years, and the Act provides
much needed health care benefits to the indigent and categorically needy. 220
Over the years, Congress has ensured Medicaid recipients have the freedom to
choose providers of their choice. 221 As states have attempted to threaten that
choice, federal courts have stepped in to protect patients. 222 The ability for
Medicaid patients to seek redress in federal court is particularly important in
218. Meghan Keneally, Meet All of the Sitting Supreme Court Justices Ahead of the New Term,
NEWS (Nov. 30, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/meet-sitting-supreme-court-justices/
story?id=37229761.
219. Gee v. Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc., 586 U.S. ____ (2018).
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light of HHS’s limited enforcement authority and the inadequate administrative
remedies included in the Medicaid Act itself.
The recent decision from the Eighth Circuit is particularly concerning
because it seems to limit patients’ ability to utilize federal courts as a means of
redress when states are not acting in compliance with protections afforded by
federal law. 223 In setting up a circuit split, the Eighth Circuit opened a path to
allowing the Supreme Court to close courthouse doors to all § 1983 claims in
Medicaid cases. The Eighth Circuit’s, decision, however, was misguided. It did
not rely on binding precedent and misapplied proper § 1983 rules of analysis.
As these cases continue rising up through federal courts, Medicaid advocates
are left hoping the Supreme Court either expressly repudiates the Eighth Circuit
for its faulty analysis. Either way, a lot is at stake for Medicaid beneficiaries’
ability to secure their freedom of choice.
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